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Introduction
Philosophies of Disability and the Global Pandemic
Shelley Lynn Tremain
BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Hamilton, Canada
Shelley Lynn Tremain has a Ph.D. in philosophy and initiated the field of philosophy 
of disability. She has published widely on a range of topics including (feminist) 
philosophy of disability, Foucault, biopolitics, genetic technologies, ableism, and 
underrepresentation in philosophy. Tremain is author of Foucault and Feminist 
Philosophy of Disability (University of Michigan Press, 2017), the manuscript for 
which won the 2016 Tobin Siebers Prize for Disability Studies in the Humanities, 
and editor of two editions of Foucault and the Government of Disability 
(University of Michigan Press 2005, 2015), an interdisciplinary collection of work 
on disability and Foucault that was recently translated into Korean. In 2016, 
Tremain was the recipient of the Tanis Doe Award for Canadian Disability Study 
and Culture. Tremain has been at the forefront of efforts to increase the diversity 
of philosophy, especially with respect to employment of disabled philosophers, 
mentorship of disabled students, and attention to critical philosophical work on 
disability. She coordinates BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, the philosophy blog 
that focuses on issues of underrepresentation in philosophy and which is home 
to Dialogues on Disability, the groundbreaking and critically acclaimed series of 
interviews that she conducts with disabled philosophers.
In my contribution to the 2018 inaugural issue of International Journal of Critical Diversity 
Studies (IJCDS), I offered an argument for why critical philosophical work on disability, con-
ducted in the new subfield of philosophy to which I had given the name “philosophy of 
disability,” should be recognized as a bona fide form of critical diversity studies (CDS). My argu-
ment in the article did the following: (1) indicated how this new area of CDS shares features with 
established areas of CDS, including Black Studies, Feminist and Gender Studies, Indigenous 
Studies, and Queer Studies; (2) articulated the outlines of the subfield of philosophy of disability; 
(3) suggested the ways in which philosophy of disability challenges the ableist demographics and 
assumptions of Eurocentric mainstream philosophy; (4) identified how philosophy of disability 
critiques dominant philosophical treatments of disability; and (5) pointed out how the fields of 
philosophy of disability and critical disability theory more generally emerged as areas of inquiry 
from activist and grassroots organizing of disabled people, spurred on by feminist, Black civil 
rights, diasporic, lesbian and gay, and other social movements internationally.
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As I argued in the 2018 article, one of the features that philosophy of disability has in 
common with other areas of CDS is a central reliance on the tools of social construction and 
a critique of essentialism. Although philosophers of disability disagree about what disability 
is, as well as how, and the extent to which, disability is socially constructed, assumptions 
about the social constitution of disability lie more or less at the heart of philosophy of disa-
bility; that is, regardless of how much practitioners of this relatively recent subfield of 
inquiry otherwise disagree, they almost unanimously agree that disability is not a natural 
state of affairs which is unconditioned by social power and other historically contingent 
influences. Indeed, the approaches to disability that philosophers of disability advance resist 
and run counter to the dominant conceptualization of disability that is persistently elabo-
rated within bioethics, cognitive science, and mainstream political philosophy and ethics 
especially, according to which disability is a natural deficit, personal misfortune, or pathol-
ogy that necessarily reduces the quality and worth of disabled people’s lives and inevitably 
leads to the social and economic disadvantages that disabled people confront. Insofar as 
practitioners of the Euro-American philosophical tradition have, with few exceptions, cast 
disability as a natural, negative, and inert state of affairs in this way, they have historically 
removed or precluded disability from the realm of philosophical inquiry and kept at bay 
philosophical debate and questioning about its epistemological, ethical, and political status.
Nevertheless, a growing body of critical philosophical work on disability addresses 
social issues and concerns pertinent to disability and disabled people that nondisabled phi-
losophers and other academics omit from serious consideration or misrepresent in ways 
that detrimentally affect disabled people. The marginalization and exclusion from philo-
sophical discourse of urgent social issues and concerns with respect to disability and the 
COVID-19 pandemic are a case in point. Mainstream philosophical discourse about the 
pandemic has largely ignored the systemic poverty, isolation, and other social disadvantages 
and inequities that have increasingly accrued to disabled people due to the pandemic. 
When, in the context of the pandemic, philosophers have considered disability at all, their 
focus has been directed almost exclusively at questions that pertain to the distribution of 
so-called scarce healthcare resources – including questions about the development of triage 
protocols; about whether disabled people can justifiably retain their ventilators if COVID-19 
hospital units require them; and about which disabled people, in which countries, should or 
should not be prioritized for vaccination.
This special issue of IJCDS – which is devoted to the theme “Philosophies of Disability 
and the Global Pandemic” – goes beyond an exclusive focus on the aforementioned questions 
in order to address the range of discursive gaps with respect to disability that have coalesced 
in critical philosophical discussions about the COVID-19 pandemic, doing so in ways that 
acknowledge how nationality, race, gender, class, colonialism, and other apparatuses of power 
always already condition and shape disability. Taken as a whole, the peer-reviewed contribu-
tions to the issue resist the obfuscation of these lacunae by considering (among other things) 
how the circumstances of the current COVID-19 pandemic sharpen the focus of various 
critical conceptions of disability and ableism; how this pandemic has affected disabled people 
economically, socially, institutionally, and internationally; the implications (especially for 
disabled people) of novel forms of social organization, mechanisms of (dis)association, and 
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practices of division that characterize the COVID-19 pandemic; and the extent to which or 
even whether the current pandemic – which has thrown into relief social, economic, national, 
racial, and other disparities, as well as exacerbated them – will lead to systemic social, eco-
nomic, political, and institutional change that benefits disabled people and members of other 
marginalized and disenfranchised social groups.
Let me open “Philosophies of Disability and the Global Pandemic” by providing brief 
descriptions of the provocative and timely articles that this highly illuminating special issue 
of IJCDS comprises.
In my contribution, I provide additional background on the subfield of philosophy of 
disability and its relations to work in various areas of mainstream philosophy, including 
bioethics and social epistemology. Then I adopt an approach derived from critical geneal-
ogy to closely examine the nursing home-industrial-complex that lies at the center of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in many jurisdictions, concentrating on how the COVID-19 tragedy 
has unfolded in nursing homes, so-called long-term care facilities, and other institutions in 
which elders and younger disabled people across Canada are confined.
In her article, Gabriela Ramirez Arguedas amplifies notions of disposability introduced 
in my article to demonstrate that the epistemic authority of the dominant narrative about 
COVID-19 in Costa Rica is grounded in discriminatory and oppressive ideologies of nor-
malization with respect to which people’s lives and bodies are valued. As Arguedas explains, 
this official discourse about the COVID-19 pandemic expresses the condescending and 
paternalistic tradition of medical epistemology in Costa Rica. How, Arguedas asks, does this 
narrative discourse affect the way that older people and disabled people are treated during 
this pandemic?
Elvis Imafidon continues these examinations of the embodied character of asymmetries 
of value and power in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, Imafidon is 
concerned with the asymmetries of value and power that, he argues, are inherent in African 
communitarian philosophy’s assumptions about personhood and the implications of these 
assumptions for disabled people’s access to healthcare, especially during this pandemic. For 
Imafidon, elimination of these asymmetries requires that the dominant conception of com-
munity embedded in African thought be broadened.
Two articles in this special issue draw upon the work of French philosopher and decolo-
nial psychiatrist Frantz Fanon. Emily Anne Parker elaborates how Fanon’s critique of the 
distinctions between human and earthly agency, human and body, and human and animal 
provide the framework for his claims about the significance of colonial wartime “cortico-
visceral disorders.” For Fanon, Parker notes, the colony is a manifestation of disgust for 
blackness, animality, the agency of soil, and powers of the sun, as well as for disability that 
the colony itself produces and, simultaneously, is an effort to install a nonracialized and 
nondisabled, that is, universal, agency. As Parker explains it, a Fanonian response to the 
global pandemic and climate crisis would, therefore, appreciate the array of crises that arise 
when humanity is understood as the opposite of the Earth. In their article, furthermore, 
Suze G. Berkhout, Lindsey MacGillivray, and Kathleen Sheehan explore the insights and 
tensions between Fanon’s psychiatric writings, mad studies, and critical prison studies, link-
ing this work to their own professional and practical experience as inpatient (acute-care) 
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psychiatrists tasked with the implementation of ward policy changes in light of COVID-19 
infection control concerns. Indeed, these co-authors underscore the ways in which the 
COVID-19 pandemic offers a particularly salient moment in which to identify and reflect – 
in highly concrete ways – on shifts in psychiatric carcerality.
The phenomenon of psychiatric carcerality and the COVID-19 pandemic also provides 
the motivation for Sara M. Bergstresser’s contribution to this special issue. Bergstresser is con-
cerned with the continuation in the United States, even during the COVID-19 pandemic, of 
involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. Bergstresser situates psychiatric diagnosis and hospi-
talization within the context of decades of social and historical research, as well as emergent 
fields of inquiry – including feminist philosophy of disability, CDS, and mad studies – in order 
to argue that a socially mediated process, legitimated with appeals to “health” and “safety,” 
should not be maintained during a pandemic of a communicable virus that especially endan-
gers people in congregate settings such as psychiatric wards, prisons, and nursing homes.
In some respects, the article that Johnathan Flowers has contributed to “Philosophies of 
Disability and the Global Pandemic” returns this special issue to questions and concerns intro-
duced at its outset, that is, raises questions about the position of disabled people vis-à-vis the 
university and underscores concerns with respect to both the virtual exclusion of disabled 
people from the discipline of philosophy and the oft-demeaning situation of disabled people 
within academia more generally. The crux of Flowers’s argument in the article is that the pre-
sumed accessibility gains that have emerged in the COVID-19 pandemic – including the 
presumed gains within academia – are the products of a world that is prepared for some people 
and their bodies and not for other people and their bodies. Drawing upon Sara Ahmed’s work 
on the inheritance of a world, Flowers argues that ableism prepares the world for inheritance 
by nondisabled people and their bodies but not disabled people and their bodies.
As my brief overview of the articles that make up this special issue of IJCDS indicates, 
the contributions to this collection articulate perspectives and concerns left out of main-
stream philosophical and popular discourses about the pandemic. Hence, the contributions 
to the issue challenge (each in its own way) philosophers and other critical thinkers to 
expand the array of methods, approaches, and techniques with which they identify and 
understand the events and implications of the phenomena of the COVID-19 global pan-
demic. Indeed, I am sure that this issue of IJCDS and the essays that it comprises mark 
merely the beginning of that historically signficant process.
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